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 DISSENTING OPINION 
 
HEBERT, JUDGE: 
 
I cannot agree with the opinion expressed or with the 
action taken by a majority of the members of the Tribunal 
under the ruling just announced. I am not willing to issue the 
command of backward march to hopeful developments in 
international law that are directed toward the outlawing of 
aggressive war through application of penal sanctions to the 
actions of those who have had significant participation in 
planning or preparing for the Nazi acts of aggression. The 
action of the Tribunal, in my opinion, is tantamount to 
issuance of such a command. It ignores the historic 
importance of these trials and disregards an opportunity, that 
does not often come in the affairs of nations, to contribute 
by orderly development of the law to the building part of a 
new legal order in international affairs. Erroneous legal 
conclusions have been drawn from the judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 
IMT). These errors are matched only by the equally 
incorrect conclusions as to matters of fact. The result is 
incongruity itself for there is left in the case under Count 
One only the relatively minor offense of participating in the 
waging of an aggressive war, a charge which has never been 
separately brought although there has been ample 
opportunity to do so in these proceedings at Nuremberg. The 
charge of waging an aggressive war, that is, merely 
supporting the war effort, after the war is underway and its 
aggressive character is known does not strike at the 
gravamen of the Crime against Peace. That gravamen is, of 
course, the launching or initiation of the war or aggressive 
 act, including participation in the planning and preparation 
connected therewith. It is wrong, therefore, so to reform 
the indictment as substantially to change the major issues 
in the pending proceedings. 
But aside from the above aspects, it should be stated 
for the record that a large segment of the community of 
nations, by ratifying the London Agreement and the 
principles of the Charter of the IMT, has given 
unmistakable evidence of the importance of adhering to 
the concept of individual penal responsibility for what has 
been called the greatest of all crimes--the launching of 
aggressive war. These generalities do not beg the 
questions presently before the Tribunal. They emphasize 
the relationship of certain fundamental premises inherent 
in the Charter and judgment of the IMT as essential for a 
proper enterpretation and application of Control Council 
Law No. 10 to the acts of these defendants. 
We must frankly recognize that in the interpretation 
of statutory pro- visions couched in broad language, such 
as the definition of the 
Crime against Peace in the Charter and Control Council 
Law No. 10, and in the development of international law 
after the traditional method of the common law there must 
always be a first case presenting difficult questions of 
construction and application. But we should not allow the 
novelty of these proceedings or allow the fact that this is 
the first case in which a group of industrialists have been 
called before a court of justice to answer for their actions 
alleged to constitute crimes against peace, to deter us from 
the application of statutory provisions reasonably plain in 
their meaning to facts abundantly 
 proven by the evidence. The common law technique 
involves development of law case by case. It is, therefore, 
a mistake to consider the judgment of the IMT as an 
ultimate codification of the law in reference to the crime 
against peace. It is equally a mistake to interpret specific 
findings as to individual defendants as controlling 
precedents leading inescapably to the conclusion of non- 
responsibility under a rule of caution not expressed but 
read into the sum total of the IMT acquittals. 
But to turn to the specific issues at hand. Before this 
Tribunal there has been presented for decision the 
important and broad question of whether the defendants, or 
any of them are criminally responsible for the actions of 
the great chemical combine, I. G. Farbenindustrie A. G., 
during the period of preparation and planning prior to 
World War II and subsequently during the waging-of that 
war. The broad question thus stated, is more specifically 
presented in the indictment which has been filed by the 
office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes against these 
defendants. The indictment is drawn in five counts, two of 
which expressly charge the commission of crimes against 
peace. Count I of the indictment charges the defendants 
with participation in the planning, preparation, initiation 
and waging of wars of aggression and invasions of other 
countries in violation of international laws and treaties. 
The specific invasions and wars of aggression referred to 
in this Count are enumerated in paragraph 2 of the 
indictment as follows: 
"The invasions and wars of aggression referred to in 
the preceding paragraph were as follows: against 
Austria, 12 March 1937; 
 against Czechoslovakia, 1 October, 1938, and 15 
March, 1939; against Poland, 1 September, 1939; 
against the United Kingdom and France, 3 September, 
1939; against Denmark and Norway, 9 April, 1940; 
against Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, 10 
May, 1940; against Yugoslavia and Greece, 6 April, 
1941 against the U.S.S.R., 22 June, 1941; and against 
the United States of America, 11 December, 1941." 
This Count further alleges that the defendants acted through 
the instrumentality of Farben and otherwise, with divers other 
persons during a period of years preceding 8 May, 1945 in 
participating in crimes against peace. It is charged that the 
defendants, all of whom are alleged to have held high 
positions in the financial, industrial and economic life of 
Germany, committed these Crimes Against Peace as defined 
by Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, in that they were 
principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a 
consenting part in, were connected with plans and enterprises 
involving, and were members of organizations or groups, 
including Farben, which were connected  with the 
commission of said crimes. Allegations of fact, said to 
constitute the particulars of the defendants, participation in the 
planning, preparation, initiation and waging of wars of 
aggression are set forth in great detail. In summary these 
allegations of fact include charges; that an early alliance was 
formed by Farben with Hitler and the Nazi party, pursuant to 
which Farben assisted Hitler and the Nazi Party in the early 
stages of the seizure and consolidation of power and that this 
alliance continued until broken by force of arms in May 1945; 
that Farben synchronized its activities with the military 
planning of the German High Command in the building of an 
effective war machine in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, 
that Farben participated significantly 
 in the Four Year Plan and in directing and planning 
Germany's economic preparation and mobilization for 
war; that Farben participated in creating and equipping the 
Nazi military machine for aggressive war by making 
Germany self- sufficient in critical materials essential to 
waging war, particularly with regard to synthetic nitrates, 
synthetic oil and gasoline and synthetic rubber; that 
Farben participated in the procurement and stockpiling of 
critical war materials for the Nazi offensive; that Farben 
participated in the weakening of Germany's potential 
enemies by using its cartel agreements to strengthen 
Germany and by retarding production in the United States 
of certain vital war products; that Farben engaged in 
propaganda, intelligence and espionage activities in 
cooperation with the Wehrmacht, with the Auslands 
organization of the Nazi party and in other subversive 
activities; that the plans and activities of Farben were- 
intensified with the approach of each aggressive act and 
with a view to reaping the spoils from aggression; to this 
latter end it is charged that Farben developed detailed 
plans for the exploitation of industry in the occupied 
countries to meet the needs of the German war machine 
and to further the ambitious design of Farben to expand its 
economic empire; and finally that Farben participated in 
plunder, spoliation, slavery and mass murder as an integral 
part of the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of 
wars of aggression. The acts and conduct alleged to 
constitute participation in plunder and spoliation (Count 
Two of the Indictment) and the acts and conduct alleged 
to constitute participation in slavery and mass 
 murder (Count Three of the Indictment) are incorporated 
into Count One by reference as an integral part of the 
alleged crime against peace charged in Count One of the 
indictment. 
Count Five of the indictment charges the defendants 
with participation in the formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit or which involved 
commission of crimes against peace as defined by Control 
Council Law No. 10. Here, also as under Count One, the 
defendants are alleged to have acted through the 
instrumentality of Farben and otherwise with divers other 
persons during a period of years preceding 8 May 1945. 
The defendants under this Count are charged with 
participating as leaders, organizers, instigators and 
accomplices in the common plan or conspiracy and are 
charged with responsibility for their own acts and for all 
acts committed by any person in the execution of such 
common plan or conspiracy. It is charged that the acts and 
conduct of the defendants set forth in Count One and the 
acts and conducts charged under Count Two (participation 
in plunder and spoliation) and Count Three (participation 
in slavery and mass murder) formed a part of the alleged 
common plan or conspiracy and are incorporated in the 
conspiracy count by reference. 
Count Two of the Indictment charges the, 
defendants with the commission of War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity as defined in 
Article II of Control Council Law No. 10 in that they 
participated in the plunder of public and private property, 
exploitation, spoliation, and other offenses against 
 property in the countries and territories which came 
under the belligerent occupation of Germany in the 
course of its invasions and aggressive wars. It is alleged 
that the defendants acted through the instrumentality of 
Farben and otherwise, with divers other persons, during 
the period from 12 March 1938 to 8 May 1945 in the 
commission of the said crimes. The charge specifies that 
the defendants committed the alleged war crimes and 
crimes against humanity as defined by Article II of 
Control Council Law No. 10, in that they were principals 
in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part 
in, were connected with plans and enterprises involving 
and were members of organizations or groups, including 
Farben, which were connected with, the commission of 
said crimes. Detailed allegations of fact said to constitute 
particulars of defendants' participation in plunder and 
spoliation are recited in the indictment. 
The specific allegations set forth plans said to have 
been formulated by Farben for the acquisition, with the 
aid of German Military Force, of plant facilities and other 
property and raw material constituting either all or 
important segments of the chemical industries of Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, France and Russia. 
With the exception of Russia these plans are alleged to 
have been executed by Farben as to the plant acquisitions 
I specifically enumerated in the indictment. The details 
of this is more fully discussed elsewhere. 
The acts and conduct of the defendants alleged as 
constituting plunder 
 and spoliation are alleged to be violations of the laws and 
customs of war, of international treaties and conventions, 
including Articles 46-56, inclusive, of the Hague 
Regulations of 1907, of the general principles of criminal 
law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations, 
of the internal penal laws of the countries in which such 
crimes were committed, and of Article II of Control Council 
Law No. 10. 
Count Three of the indictment charges the defendants 
with the commission of War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity as defined by Article II of Control Council Law 
No. 10. The defendants are charged with: (1) participation in 
the enslavement and deportation to slave labor on a gigantic 
scale of members of the civilian population of countries and 
territories under the belligerent occupation of, or otherwise 
controlled by Germany; (2) participation in the enslavement 
of concentration camp inmates, including German nationals; 
(3) participation in the use of prisoners of war in war 
operations and in work having direct relation to war 
operations, including the manufacture and transportation of 
war material and equipment; (4) participation in the 
mistreatment, terrorization, torture, and murder of enslaved 
persons. 
The indictment charges that the defendants acted through the 
instrumentality of Farben and otherwise, with divers other 
persons, during the period from 1 September, 1939 to 8 May, 
194-, committing these War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity. It is charged that defendants were principals in, 
accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, 
were connected with plans and enterprises involving, and 
were members of organizations or groups, including Farben, 
which were connected with, the 
 commission of said crimes. 
Allegations of facts said to constitute the particulars 
of defendants, participation in slavery and mass murder 
are recited at length in the indictment. The acts and 
conduct of the defendants which are charge as 
participation in slavery and mass murder said to 
constiture violations of international conventions, 
particularly Articles 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 18, 23, 43, 46 and 52 of the Hague 
Regulations, 1907, and of Articles 2, 3, 4, 6, 9 - 15, 23, 
25, 27 - 34, 46 - 48, 50, 51, 54, 56, 57, 60, 62, 63, 65 - 68, 
and 76 of the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of 
War, of the laws and customs of war, of the general 
principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal 
laws of all civilized nations, of the internal penal laws of 
the countries in which such crimes were committed, and 
of Article II of Control Council Law No. 10. 
Under Count Four of the indictment three of the 
defendants, Schneider, Buetefisch and von der Heyde are 
charged with membership, subsequent to 1 September 
1939, in the SS, organization declared to be criminal by 
the IMT, and Paragraph 1(d) of Article II of Control 
Council Law No. 10. 
The foregoing summary of the charges as set forth 
in the indictment is indicative of the tremendous scope of 
the evidence introduced on behalf of the prosecution to 
prove the charges. 
Shortly after conclusion of the prosecution's case in 
chief, and before the opening statements on behalf of the 
defense, there was filed, under date of 17 December, 
1947, a motion of the Defense for a finding of not guilty. 
 The motion which was signed on behalf of twenty-two of 
the twenty-three W defendants requests the Tribunal to 
enter a finding of not guilty with respect to the charges and 
all particulars under Counts One and 
Five, and also with respect to the charges and all particulars 
under Counts One and Five, and also with respect to the 
charges and particulars under Count Two, so far as the 
alleged Austrian and Czechoslovakian cases of spoliation 
(dealt with in paragraphs 90 to 96 of the indictment(are 
concerned. 
The basis and grounds urged by the motion may be 
summarized as follows: 
     (1) It is contended that, regardless of the wording 
of Control Council Law No. 10, the Tribunal is bound by 
the Charter of the IMT as inter-preted by the IMT in its 
judgment. It is said that Control Council Law No. 10, in 
defining the offenses within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal, 
cannot introduce any elements not recognized by the 
Charter and the judgment of the IMT otherwise this 
Tribunal, it is contended, would violate the "principle of 
law" that there can be no punishment of crimes without pre-
existing law. From this premise it is further contended, that 
with any difference in phraseology between Control 
Council Law No. 10 and the Charter as interpreted by the 
IMT, the latter must govern. 
    (2) It is argued that the provisions of Control 
Council Law No. 10, Article II, paragraph 2(f) dealing with 
responsibility of individuals who have held high positions 
in the financial, industrial or economic life of Germany 
cannot be construed as establishing any criminal 
responsibility in the defendants. It is pointed out that this 
provision is not contained in the 
 Charter and it is said that the argument set forth in 
paragraph (1) above is applicable and this provision 
should be given no weight at all by the Tribunal. This 
phase of the motion maintains that paragraph 2(f) of 
Article II of Control Council Law No. 10 can have no 
legal effect in reference to the shifting of the burden of 
proof; further that it cannot have the legal effect of 
supporting the proposition that no distinction is to be 
made between “private persons” and “government 
officials” in assessing criminal responsibility for Crimes 
against Peace. 
(3) The basic argument is advanced that in addition 
to participation in the preparation of an aggressive war, 
the prosecution must establish “beyond any reasonable 
doubt on the part of each defendant separately a certain 
state of mind consisting of a definitely knowledge of 
specific aggressive plans of Hitler.” To state this 
argument differently, it means that, conceding for 
purposes of the motion that preparation for aggressive 
warfare has been established by the evidence, this alone 
does not constitute the requisite proof, but the proof must 
establish, in addition, that each defendant sought to be 
held responsible had actual knowledge of some specific 
aggressive plan of Hitler. 
(4) Reference is made to the findings of the IMT 
judgment with reference to a number of the individual 
defendants and it is argued that the IMT limited the 
original responsibility for crimes against peace to a 
specific limited circle of men who had actual knowledge 
of specific aggressive plans of Hitler which he revealed at 
certain secret meetings to his closest advisers. 
 From this argument it is urged that unless a defendant 
attended or knew of the decisions reached as to specific 
aggressive plans as discussed at the so-called planning 
conferences of Hitler on 5 November 1937, 23 May, 
1939, 22 August, 1939, and 23 November, 1939, there 
is no responsibility under the charge of conspiracy and 
planning and preparation of aggressive war. 
(5) It is argued that the IMT judgment declared 
that there existed no single conspiracy to wage 
aggressive war but that there were separate plans. It is 
argued that under the IMT conviction of a Crime 
against Peace can only be based on a special knowledge 
of specific aggressive plans of Hitler and on a direct 
participation in the elaboration of such plans. 
(6) It is argued that a broader conception of the 
Crime against Peace, as urged by the prosecution, 
would not only be vague in its application but would 
result in mass punishment of the German people 
contrary to the principle that guilt must be individual 
and personal. It is urged that the only reasonable 
limitation is that applied by the IMT based on the 
special knowledge of the limited circle consisting of 
those intimate planners knowing of Hitler's specific 
aggressive plans. It is argued that this circle is probably 
limited to high governmental and military functionaries. 
(7) It is argued that no evidence has been 
introduced showing there is likewise no evidence of 
common planning or conspiracy to wage an 
participation of the defendants in the secret plantings of 
Hitler and that aggressive war. It is urged that the 
defendants acquitted of Crimes against 
 Peace by the IMT all served the moral, economic or 
military strengthening of Germany and that they also 
furthered the military power of Germany. 
(8) It is urged that the activities of the defendants in 
war production after the outbreak of the war do not 
constitute the waging of aggressive war. In this 
connection the acquittal of Speer is referred to as a 
controlling precedent eleminating those engaged in 
productive enterprise from criminal responsibility for the 
waging of aggressive war. 
(9) As to spoliation in Austria and Czechoslovakia 
it is urged that an act of spoliation can only be charged as 
a war crime and only if the country was engaged in open 
warfare with Germany; that only in the latter situation are 
the rules of land warfare as laid down in Articles 53 and 
56 of the Hague Convention applicable. It is urged that 
the occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia were not 
aggressive wars. It is said that the act of spoliation 
charged in 
Czechoslovakia relates to property in the Sudentenland 
and that the expression of the IMT as to the aggressive 
character of the action against Bohemia and Moravia is 
inapplicable. Further, that the defendants did not know 
Austria and Czechoslovakia were occupied pursuant to a 
common plan of aggression and that the defendants 
cannot be held responsible for these alleged acts of 
spoliation.  
The motion to a very large extent is predicated 
upon conclusions of law but it goes beyond the purview 
of a motion raising merely a question of law. It in effect 
states that, as a matter of law, to convict the defendants of 
 Conspiracy. 
A combination of persons for the 
accomplishment of some unlawful 
purpose. If there is unity of purpose in 
a common design to accomplish a 
criminal purpose there is the crime of 
conspiracy. 
Financial support of Hitler and 
the Nazi party does not [CROSSED 
OUT of itself] constitute a crime 
against peace. At most this shows that 
Farben was willing to do business 
with Hitler, but in the early stages of 
the seizure of power by the Nazis 
such support may have been 
motivated by the mistaken belief that 
his political program would not lead 
to the horrors and excesses which are 
now part of the history of the Nazi 
government in German. - 
Crimes against Peace there must be direct and positive 
proof of knowledge of one of the specific plans of 
Hitler for aggression as concerns a particular invasion 
or aggressive act, i.e. specific knowledge of the plans 
against Austria, or Czechoslovakia, or Poland or of any 
other country which was the victim of Nazi aggression. 
It is contended that for lack of such proof the Counts 
charging Crimes against Peace should be dismissed and 
a finding of not guilty entered without the necessity of 
considering evidence offered on behalf of the defense. 
Proper consideration of the motion therefore 
requires first a comprehensive statement of the legal 
principles that re here applicable in reference to those 
Counts of the indictment that charge Crimes against 
Peace; and, secondly, an analysis of what the evidence 
establishes to sustain the principles of criminal 
responsibility as so stated. In the latter connection there 
is obviously not time at this stage of the case to review 
all of the evidence as applied to each individual 
defendant. The motion should, therefore, be dismissed 
if the evidence sustains the charges as to Counts One 
and Five as to any of the defendants. 
